ABSTRACT It seems rather natural to admit that language use is governed by rules that relate signs, forms and meanings to possible intentions or possible interpretations, in function of utterance situations. Not less natural should seem the idea that the meaning of a natural language expression conveys enough material to the input of these rules, so that, given the situation of utterance, they determine the appropriate interpretation.
If this is correct, the semantic description of a natural language expression should output not only the 'informative content' of that expression, but also all sorts of indications concerning the way this expression may be used or interpreted. In particular, the argumentative power of utterances is due to argumentative indications conveyed by the sentences uttered, indications that are not part of their informative content . This paper emphasizes the role of argumentation in language and shows bow it could be accounted for in a formal Representation Semantics framework. An "example of an analysis is provided in order to show the "system at work".
I. ARGUMENTATION AND THE SEMANTIC PROGRAM.
A. What is linguistic in argumentation.
The theory of argumentation developped by Jean-Claude Anscombre and Oswald Ducrot is an attempt to describe some aspects of language that have not been carefully studied yet, in spite of their importance for linguistic theory, discourse representation, as well as simulation of understanding.
In their framework, utterances are seen to be produ@ed in order to argue for some particular conclusions with a certain force, depending on the situation of utterance. Thus, when I utter (I) This is beautiful but expensive in front of a shop window and pointing to some item, I present my utterance as a reason for not buying this item, ~hile if I say (2) This is expensive but beautiful *This work has been supported in part by a contract with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (contrat~n ° 95. 5122) I am giving a reason to buy the item I.
Note that after uttering(l), I can perfectly walk into the store and buy the item : what is odd, in normal situations is to say (I') (l') This is beautiful but expensive, and therefore, I will buy it.
Anscombre and Ducrot unburied the old Aristotelician concept of topoi to describe the movement from the utterance to the conclusion. They take these topoi to be of the form :
(To) The more X is P, the more Y is Q.
where 'X is P' is the idea expressed by the original utterance, and 'Y is Q' is the argumentative orientation (the conclusion argued for by producing the original utterance in the particular situation in which it is uttered). In Raccah 84, I have argued for the adequacy of a slightly different form for the topoi, which takes into account the epistemical relation of the speaker to the p~miss : (T) The more evidence I have in favor of X being P The more arguments l'have in favor of Y being Q.
Topoi of this kind are shown to avoid problems with non-gradual properties and, I argue, are closer to the intuition we have about the argumentative process 2.
The description of argumentative connectives provides rules to select the argumentative orientation of a compounded utterance in function of the more basic utterances that they connect.
Thus, the analysis of (1), (i'), and (2) suggests the following description of the argumentative aspects of but :
in any utterance of P but Q, the presence of but Ii am talking here of normal situations , where expensiveness is a reason not to buy, while beauty is a reason to buy 2The idea is that it is not the degree of P-uess of X (when this means something) that makes Y (more or less) Q, but the degree to which the speaker believes X is P that entitles him (her) to believe (more or less) that Y is Q. this kind of justifications do not concern us here, but I realize that even the ugly notion of informative content seems to have more intuitive backup than this one : a story to be continued...
The present king of France is very old but he plays Jazz. in a cultural context where it is believed that a) old people tend not to like Jazz, and b) people who play Jazz tend to like it.
Note that there are very many other things believed about old people, such as (a') (a') old people tend to be wise, and many other things believed about people who play Jazz, such as (b') (b') people who play Jazz tend to wake up late in the morning.
We will take the topos expressing (a) to be the rule :
Where 0 stands for old, L for like and "#i, for Jazz I, and the topos expressing ~--to be the rule Where ~ stands for play.
Suppose now that the analysis of (4) (4) The present king of France is very old gives the following four formulae :
Rl (4) :
where K , V~) mean "present king of France", and "very old", ~
~(~)
means "the unique x such that ~(~)# , ~ "
• s truth. PI(4) says that (4) presupposes that there is a unique entity which is the present king of France ; P2(4) says that (4) asserts that this entity is very old ; RI(4) says that (4) imposes no conditions on argumentation ; and R2(4) says that (4) is pre-oriented towards whatever conclusion can be infered from the present king of France being old, and that the conclusion will obtain with a force, Similarily, suppose that the analysis of (5): I This is terribly sloppy (the symbolic language used is not defined) and incomplete (for instance, there should be an indication of conditions on the application of the topos), but it doesn't affect my purpose. If, in addition, we have a formal description of but in accordance to what has been suggested in section I, we account, in a compositional way, for all of the four aspects of (3) which corresponds to the actual interpretations of (3). In particular, this description correctly predicts that, without further information about the context of utterance, the pair of topoi that are naturally selected to interpret (3) is (Ta,Tb) rather than the other three possibilities mentioned here. In fact, to [elect (Ta,Tb') , we would have to believe tha~o like Jazz and to wake up late in the morning are incompatible while believing that people who play Jazz tend to wake up late in the morning. If we wanted to select (Ta',Tb) we would have to believe that to be wise and to like Jazz are opposed : this is a possible choice, and an utterance of (3) where these topoi were forced by some additional contextual information would be likely to shock some people (including myself).
Finally, if we wanted to select (Ta',~b') , we would have to believe that to be wise and to wake up late in the morning are opposed : another possible choice, that might have more adepts than ~ the last one.
The theory is still young ; its formal version is even younger, and certainly very imperfect. However, it is the only theory on the "market" (and for that reason, the first one...) which examines this aspect of semantics, and offers a basis for a conception of a Natural Language Processor that might "grasp the idea" expressed by a text and not only retrieve pieces of information.
A computer version of a small fragment of French is now at study. The programming languages used for this study are PROLOG and LISP. 
